Here is a list of my publications, as well as online versions of some of them. If you would like to see a paper that I haven’t uploaded, please email me.
1. (forthcoming) Attention, psychology and pluralism The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
2.(forthcoming) Crowding, Attention and Consciousness: In Support of the Inference Hypothesis. Mind and Language. Co-authored with Bilge Sayim.
3. (2017) Powerful qualities, phenomenal concepts and the new challenge to physicalism. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1321678
4. (2017) Powerful qualities and pure powers. Philosophical Studies. DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0918-1
5.(2017) Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical. Philosophical Studies. 174: 1895-1910.
6. (2017) Conceptual fragmentation and the rise of eliminativism. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 7: 17-40. Co-authored with Peter Vickers.
7. (2015) Against unifying accounts of attention. Erkenntnis. 80 (1): 39-56.
8. (2013) Is the grain of vision finer than the grain of attention? Response to Block Thought: a Journal of Philosophy. 2 (1): 20-28.
(For a response to this paper, see Block, N. 2013. Seeing and windows of integration. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 29-39)
9. (2013) Physicalism and phenomenal concepts: bringing ontology and philosophy of mind together. Philosophia. 41: 1283-1297.
10. (2013) Is attention necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies. 20: 173-194.
Paper in edited collection.
1. (forthcoming) A powerful new anomalous monism. To appear in M. Guta (ed.) Ontology and Consciousness. (Routledge).
1. (forthcoming) Review of “From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind.” Howard Robinson. Times Literary Supplement.
2. (2014) Review of “Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness” C. Hill and D. Bennett (eds.) MIT Press. Analysis. 76 (1): 108-111
3. (2013) Review of “After Physicalism” Benedikt Paul Göcke (ed.). Mind. 123 (490): 601-604.